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Universal access to justice is a fundamental right of every citizen in society. Its 
provision is necessary to legitimate the state, meet international obligations, and 
satisfy the rule of law. In New Zealand, access to justice is ensured by Legal Aid, a 
state-funded social service which provides legal representation to poor litigants in 
criminal and civil proceedings. At the present time however, Legal Aid is under 
threat because of its growing costs to the state. This growth is primarily a result of 
an increasing emphasis on legal rights in today's reformed welfare state, and a rise 
in legally aided litigation. To answer this escalating expenditure, the government is 
implementing several cost-saving measures to the legal aid scheme. These measures 
include reductions to remuneration rates for legal aid lawyers, the introduction of 
Public Defenders and Block Contracting, the changing of eligibility and contribution 
levels for legal aid, and a review of funding for community law centres. This essay 
examines these measures and comments on their ability to maintain the level of 
access to justice in the current scheme. It is suggested that the government's 
measures are not desirable because of their potential to undermine the quality of 
legal representation for poor people, the right to choice of counsel, the accessibility 
of the scheme, and the poor's need for legal information. Although the government's 
measures are necessary to contain expenditure, it is thus thought that alternatives 
must be considered to maintain an adequate level of access to justice in society. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) compnses 
approximately 14,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The universal prov1s1on of legal services for the poor is of prime importance in 
modem society. Not only is it essential for fundamentals like equality before the law 
and the health of the adversarial system, but it plays a crucial role in legitimising the 
whole existence and authority of the state. However, in most western nations today, 
the adequate provision of legal services to the poor is under threat. This threat is a 
result of the state's increasing financial unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to ensure 
that universal access to legal services is a reality. 
Here in New Zealand, the situation is no different. Our technique for providing legal 
services to the poor is the system of 'legal aid', through which the government 
purchases the representation services of the legal profession and provides these to the 
poor on demand. In 1990-1991, this system cost the government $37 million. 1 Only 
eight years later, this figure has ballooned to over $94 million and consequently, 
legal aid is recognised as the most steeply accelerating government expense today. 2 
To halt this rise and prevent the budget from ballooning over the $100m mark, the 
government has announced3 its intention to effect several measures for the future 
reduction of funding on the legal aid scheme.4 
The first of these measures has already been enacted. Over the past two years the 
government has made significant reductions to the amounts which lawyers are paid 
for legal aid work. Further changes are proposed under the Legal Services Bill 2000.5 
These include the piloting of a public defender scheme to more efficiently represent 
the poor in criminal proceedings, and the bulk funding of private practitioners to 
perform legal aid work in civil areas. In the mode of :reducing expenditure, the 
government is also conducting extensive :reviews of the eligibility criteria for legal 
1 Legal Services Board Annual Report 1990-1991 (Wellington, 1991). 
2 Stephen Zindel "What's going on with legal aid?" (1999) 520 Lawtalk 1, l. 
3 Tony Ryall "New Accountability and Innovation for Legal Aid" in Zindel above n 2, 2. 
4 The change of government in November 1999 has put the intended changes for legal aid on hold. 
Consequently, the changes are still being debated at the present time. 
5 Legal Services Bill 2000. 
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aid, the financial contributions required from successful applicants, and the funding 
and operation of community law centres. 6 
While these measures may thus prove effective in reducing the current financial costs 
of the legal aid scheme, concerns are raised for the resulting level of access to justice. 
Remuneration cuts, for example, may mean that many lawyers are dissuaded from 
participating in the delivery of legal services to the poor. An unfortunate 
consequence of this may be the lessening in quality of legally aided representation. 
Likewise, the introduction of public defender and bulk contracting programmes, 
while innovative, may inadvertently create an inferior service to the private market 
and would remove poor litigants' right to counsel of choice. Changes to eligibility 
and contribution levels in tum may put the legal aid scheme beyond the reach of 
many needy citizens, while a neglect of community law centres may prevent legal 
awareness in society. 
The focus of this essay is thus to examine the current state of legal aid and the 
government's answers for its financial problems. It will be argued that the 
government's measures for containing expenditure are undesirable in light of the 
need to maintain a reasonable standard of access to justice in society. Section II thus 
begins the essay by looking at why a comprehensive legal services scheme is 
necessary and how the factors of quality representation, choice of counsel, legal 
advice, and effective targeting are essential to its proper operation. Sections III and 
IV then look at New Zealand's attempts to provide these services over the years, 
through to the establishment of a comprehensive social service under the Legal 
Services Act 1991. Continuing on, section V highlights the current financial threat to 
this service while section VI begins the look at the government's various measures 
for countering the current fiscal problems. 
II WHY DOES THE STATE PROVIDE LEGAL AID? 
A Equal Access to Justice 
6 See Ryall above n 2. 
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Essentially, the reason that the government provides legal assistance to the poor is to 
ensure 'equal access to justice'. This concept of access to justice is a central tenet of 
the rule of law and of international human rights legislation. The reason for this, as 
many authors would argue, is that access to justice effectively brings about 
recognition of the law itself, and hence the political legitimacy of the state.7 
To explain, it is argued a feature of our society is that governments depend upon the 
law and its observance in order to regulate the conduct of their citizens. However, the 
government recognises that in order to effect this observance, citizens must see the 
law being applied in a fair and just manner. Accordingly, the state maintains a justice 
system, and its major organ the courts, so that all citizens, regardless of their social, 
economic, or political standing, can have the opportunity to challenge the law, to 
determine its meaning, and to gauge fairly the legality of their conduct. Access to 
this institution thus enables some degree of access to justice, and gives citizens the 
confidence required to observe the Jaw and hence provide the state with 'the consent 
of the governed' .8 
This notion of political legitimacy therefore illustrates why the government has an 
obligation to ensure equal access to justice. In addition, over the past century it has 
been recognised that access to justice has a wider importance in allowing for the 
exercise of fundamental civil, economic and social rights. 9 In any welfare state, civil 
rights such as freedom and free expression, as well as social rights to adequate 
housing and healthcare, are common. However, these rights are effectively 
meaningless without an accessible mechanism for their enforcement. Thus for 
citizens to potentially 'possess' rights, each of them must have the ability to seek 
their enforcement in a court of law. 
The obligation to provide equal access to justice 1s reflected in some of New 
Zealand's most important statutes. For example, the Magna Carta states "we will not 
deny or defer to any man, either justice or right". 10 International human rights 
7 David Luban "The Right to Legal Services" in Paterson & Goriely Resourcing Civil Justice (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1996). 
8 Luban, above n 7, 63. 
9 T.H.Marshall "Citizenship and Social Class" in Paterson & Goriely above n 8, 41. 
1° Clause 29 Magna Carta 1297. 
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legislation echoes this by asserting the state has a responsibility to see that "everyone 
is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations". 11 
While these sources thus set out the government's obligations, this responsibility is 
not merely satisfied by the provision of the courts. In modem times it has been 
acknowledged that financial, intellectual, and even cultural barriers may arise which 
prevent a citizen's access to the justice system. 12 Many of these barriers arise as a 
result of the rigid, formalistic, and complex nature of the court system. Because of 
this, a citizen will almost always require legal representation so that his or her case is 
adequately put forward. Unfortunately, legal representation means legal fees, and 
since these cannot be afforded by all, financial barriers to justice will arise for those 
of limited means. 
In line with its responsibility to ensure equal access to justice, the state thus has an 
obligation to remove these financial barriers. This latter obligation is reflected in the 
human rights legislation mentioned above, where it is stated that access to justice is a 
requirement for every citizen, "without distinction of any kind ... such as that based 
on property". 13 Arguably, this therefore implies that for the government to allow high 
financial costs for legal representation means that it is effectively denying poor 
people their right to equal justice and thus discriminating against those without 
property. 
To avoid discriminating or disadvantaging the poor, governments across the globe 
have thus gradually established schemes of legal assistance which look to 
encapsulate these access 1ights. A 1978 study by Cappelletti and Garth, featuring a 
world survey of comparative legal aid systems, in fact concluded that there was a 
pleasing world-wide trend whereby governments were taking affirmative action to 
introduce comprehensive legal aid systems for the poor.
14 Through these systems, 
11 Article 10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
12 Luban, above n 7. 
13 Article 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
14 Cappelletti and Garth (eds.) Access to Justice: a World Survey (Sitjhoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, 1978) . 
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states were meeting their obligations for equal access to justice by supplying the poor 
with state-funded legal representation in civil and criminal proceedings. 
B Ensuring Equal Access to Justice 
1 The obligation to provide 'quality' legal services 
For the state to meet its obligation for equal access to justice, it is argued that the 
mere provision of state-funded legal representation will not be enough. The 
government also has a responsibility to ensure that the legal assistance it provides is 
of a standard and quality equal to that, which can be obtained through private 
practice. While the differing ability of individual lawyers will make this objective 
difficult, as long as the state is able to retain skilled and experienced practitioners to 
represent the poor then equality in the standard of representation will be satisfied. 
The poor will then be equipped with the same resources as other litigants in 
presenting their case, and will thus not be disadvantaged by inequalities in the 
competence of legal counsel. 
There is legislative support for this obligation. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and our own Bill of Rights Act, outline every citizen's right to equal justice 15. 
Arguably, this therefore implies an obligation for the court to witness 'equality of 
arms' - the equal balancing of legal resources for each side. 1
6 This requirement was 
emphasised by the Honourable J R Marshall at the passing of the Legal Aid Act 
1969, when he stated "the balance of justice should not be loaded in favour of the 
man with means, the large corporation or the state itself'. 17 To achieve this balance 
of justice then, the poor should enjoy the same level of legal representation as the 
more affluent litigants in society. 
2 The obligation to provide a choice of counsel 
15 Article 10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Section 27 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. 
16 This argument is made by Hugh Brayne in "Is Legal Aid a Human Right?" (1989) 3 Law Society 
Gazette 25,25. 
17 Rt Hon. J.R.Marshall (November, 1969) 363 NZPD 2680. 
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Additionally, it is argued that the state's obligation for access to justice will not be 
completely met without allowing poor litigants a 'choice of counsel'. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, by giving individual litigants the freedom to select their own 
counsel, their confidence in the resulting representation is enhanced. As a result, the 
communication, trust and disclosure essential to a healthy lawyer-client relationship 
is much more likely to be present. 18 A lawyer can then mount an effective case which 
caters to the needs and situation of his or her client and thus reduces the imbalance in 
justice caused by inequalities in legal counsel. 
Secondly, and related to the point above, is the fact that choice of counsel advances 
the efficiency and fairness of the adversarial system. Our system of justice works on 
the ground that partisan advocacy on both sides of the case will best promote the 
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and innocent be free.
19 However, the 
lawyer's role as an effective advocate will be largely dependent upon the basic 
relationship of trust and confidence that the lawyer can establish with a client. The 
prevalence of this trust, and thus the health of the adversarial system, will be much 
greater when a client has specifically chosen a particular lawyer to act or his or her 
behalf. 
Because of these reasons, the right to choice of counsel has thus been recognised by 
England's Justice Report as an important right for individual litigants, and for 
maintaining the fairness of the justice system itself. 20 Similarly, in the United States 
'choice of counsel' has emerged as a fundamental right for defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 21 It is submitted that this right should be maintained by legal assistance 
schemes in New Zealand. 
18 Wayne Holly Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do 
Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent? [ 1998] 
64 Brook L Rev 183, 184. 
19 Holly above n 18. 
20 James Morton A Public Defender - a Report by Justice (Justice, London, 1987). 
21 Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963). The United States courts have not yet extended the right 
to choice of counsel to poor litigants. The rationale for this is that because defendants receive legal 
services at the expense of the taxpayer, they should not be heard to complain that they were not 
permitted to select their own counsel. Several academics have however validly pointed out that 
requirements for contributions to the legal aid schemes mean the indigent should enjoy this right as 
well. Holly above n 19. 
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3 The obligation to provide legal advice 
A third factor for improving the level of access to justice in society is the provision 
of legal advice. In recent times it has been recognised that the government's 
obligation to provide access to justice is not satisfied by the mere provision of legal 
representation. Rather, as the Hughes Commission in Scotland has noted, the state 
should also "ensure that people have the advice and assistance they need to discover 
their legal rights and, if they choose, pursue legal solutions to their problems."22 
Thus in England, the government's legal aid scheme allows for legal representation 
and the giving of legal advice to the poor. Unfortunately, in New Zealand legal aid is 
not available for legal advice that is unconnected with court proceedings - the 1969 
Legal Aid Act choosing not to include state-funded advice for fear of the potential 
costs to the state.23 Voluntary organisations such as community law and public 
education centres have thus been relied upon to provide the necessary legal 
information to the public, educating and informing them on their respective rights 
and legal avenues available. The continuing operation of these centres is thus crucial 
for maintaining access to justice in this country. 
4 The obligation to make legal aid accessible 
Finally, while the presence of a legal aid scheme goes a long way to remedying the 
imbalance in access to legal services, its actual effectiveness will be largely 
dependent upon how well the system is targeted. As a needs-based social service, it 
is clear that people should not be eligible for assistance if they can afford to pay for 
their own representation through the p1ivate market. More importantly however, it is 
essential that people who do have a need for the legal assistance are included in the 
scheme's coverage. 
It is thus argued that there are two relevant requirements for targeting legal aid at 
those in need. Firstly, the eligibility c1iteria, or means-test, for the system must be 
22 Hughes Commission Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland (HMSO, Edinburgh, 1980) 
3. 
23 Joanne Morris Women's Access to Legal Services (Law Commission, Wellington, 1999) 148. 
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adequately designed to cover all those financially unable to access a lawyer through 
the private market. Secondly, once assistance is provided, there must be no 
requirements upon users of the scheme that effectively deters them from utilising its 
benefits. In some jurisdictions this has been seen with requirements for excessive 
repayment contributions. Clearly, access to justice will not be achieved if eligibility 
and contribution levels are inaccurately calculated, and the legislation will therefore 
defeat its own objective of ensuring access to justice. 
III BACKGROUND: LEGAL AID IN NEW ZEALAND 
For most of New Zealand ' s legal history, lawyers have been the ones to enable equal 
access to justice for the poor. 24 The early twentieth century saw lawyers heavily 
subsidising their legal services, or even undertaking pure charity work, so that those 
of limited means could be adequately represented. The primary reason for this 
sac1ifice is that the legal profession has felt an obligation, in their position as 
monopoly holders of legal service, to make a contribution towards the principle of 
access to justice.25 
Unfortunately, it was clear that New Zealand's legal profession would not always be 
able to cater for the needs of the poor. The inevitable increase in legislation during 
the twentieth century caused a significant growth in the number of disputes and 
consequently, a rise in the volume of litigation before the courts. 26 Lawyers were 
thus called upon more and more to provide their charitable services. However, 
because they had to charge for their work to remain in practice, lawyers found that 
they were unable to meet the poor's demand for free representation.27 
The latter part of the twentieth century thus saw the government begin to take 
responsibility for providing legal services to the poor. In line with the worldwide 
movement to ensure equal access to justice, and consistent with its commitments 
under the welfare state to provide a level of social well-being for all citizens, the 
24 Graham Cowley "Legal Aid - from modest beginnings to?" (1999) 514 Lawtalk 12. 
25 See Section VI below for further discussion of this point. 
' 6 - Cowley above n 24. 1. 
21 C owley above n 24, 1. 
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government gradually established a system of state-funded legal assistance for the 
poor in legal proceedings. Alongside social security and family benefit schemes, 
' legal aid' was thus to be a means-tested social service which would ensure equal 
access to legal services. 
The introduction of the legal aid system did not however occur equitably for all types 
of legal proceedings. Indeed, it is a feature of legal aid systems worldwide that they 
have developed separately and differently along their civil and criminal sides. By and 
large this has reflected the fundamental difference in nature between legal aid for the 
criminally accused, and legal aid for parties in civil proceedings. 
For example, criminal law is more concerned with anti-social conduct and thus deals 
with the most critical sphere - that of a person's liberty. Criminal legal aid must 
therefore be available on the spot, and without complex procedures, in order to 
ensure that a defendant obtains a fair hearing with adequate legal representation.
28 
On the other hand, civil proceedings are more a matter of personal choice. The 
justice system's desire to see assistance provided to these litigants has thus always 
been significantly less.29 This reflects the 'rights' theory common in many 
jmisdictions whereby in criminal proceedings, because it is the state who is 
prosecuting the citizen, that citizen has a right for the state to supply an adequate 
defence. 30 It fol lows then that because the state has no direct involvement in civil 
proceedings, no right to representation exists. 
In fact, in many ju1isdictions it is recognised that divorce was the only reason civil 
legal aid developed at all. For example, in England, the Gorell Commission 
recognised that many poor citizens whose marriages had broken down irretrievably 
needed state assistance. 31 Without it, these citizens could not afford the High Court 
divorce necessary for a legitimate remarriage and would thus face the possible social 
28 A Paterson Legal Aid as a Social Service (The Cobden Trust, London, 1971) 3. 
29 Goriely & Paterson "Introduction: Resourcing Civil Justice" in Goriely & Paterson above n 7, 6. 
30 Luban above n 7, 45 . 
31 Tamara Goriely "Rushcliffe Fifty Years On: The Changing Role of Civil Legal Aid Within the 
Welfare State" in Goriely & Paterson above n 7,219. 
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stigmas of adultery and bastardy. To fairly cater for these citizens a scheme of legal 
assistance was thus required. 
Nowadays, the extension of legal aid to virtually all types of civil proceedings 
demonstrates the equal importance of civil representation. Primarily, this may be 
because there are many types of civil proceedings that resemble criminal law and its 
fundamental concern with the protection of people and their freedoms. Examples of 
this include domestic protection orders and even the resolution of matrimonial 
disputes which prevent the continuance or occurrence of disagreements and even 
violence. As preventive measures, these proceedings thus arguably involve the state 
in an equally direct way and therefore require legal representation for their just 
resolution. 
Generally however, due to their more obvious differences, it is no surpnse that 
criminal forms of legal aid, as opposed to civil, have been present for a long time. 
Criminal legal aid began in New Zealand with the Justices of the Peace Amendment 
Act 191232 which, essentially a copy of Britain's earlier Poor Prisoners Defence Act 
1903,33 provided financial assistance for the accused in all trials on indictment. The 
lawyers who undertook this work were thus remunerated by the state at a rate 
analogous to Crown solicitors. In 1933, New Zealand's Poor Prisoners Defence Act 
then extended state assistance to poor defendants who were charged with serious 
summary offences, or whose 'exceptional circumstances' justified a grant.
34 It was 
not until the passing of the Offenders' Legal Aid Act 1954 however that the scope of 
c1iminal aid was widened to all cases brought before the criminal courts, whether the 
d · 35 accuse was appeanng on sentence or not. 
In civil proceedings, the generosity of the New Zealand legal profession and a 
smaller number of cases meant that a legal aid system was unnecessary for many 
years. In 1926, the Law Society even took over the responsibility for poor persons to 
see that their needs were met.36 Gradually however, as increasing cases tested this 
32 Justices of the Peace Amendment Act 1912. 
33 Poor Prisoners Defence Act 1903 (UK). 
34 Poor Prisoners' Defence Act 1933. 
35 Offenders Legal Aid Act 1954. 
36 Department of Justice Access to the Law: A Research and Discussion Paper (Wellington, 1981). 
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charity and as pressure arose from human rights legislation, the legislature saw it as 
necessary to establish a system whereby civil legal aid was also guaranteed. The 
passing of the Legal Aid Act 1969 thus provided this assistance and also ensured that 
lawyers were adequately remunerated by the state for their services to the poor. 37 
In the later decades of the twentieth century, the Offenders Legal Aid Act 1954 and 
the Legal Aid Act 1969 thus served to provide sufficient state assistance for poor 
litigants in legal proceedings. However, while this system generally worked well, 
several inequalities in the way civil and criminal legal aid was administered, along 
with the diffe1ing pay rates for lawyers under each, meant that some unifying system 
was needed. 38 In 1991, the Legal Services Act was thus enacted to bring legal aid for 
criminal and civil proceedings under one umbrella.39 
IV THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK: LEGAL SERVICES ACT 1991 
A A Judicare Scheme 
Legal aid in New Zealand has always been delivered through the classic 'judicare 
scheme'. GeneraJly, this model operates through the state funding private lawyers to 
provide legal services to the poor on demand. Although potentially limitless and thus 
expensive, this form of delivery has proven to be very effective in providing poor 
litigants with equal access to the justice system. Provided the eligibility criteria are 
accurate, whoever qualifies as a person of 'insufficient means' can obtain the same 
private legal assistance as other citizens and will have the freedom to select a lawyer 
of their choice. Thus it has been stated of the judicare scheme that the only difference 
to the private market is in who pays the bill.4
0 Notably, the effectiveness of this 
model is demonstrated by its predominance in most industrial countries of the 
Western world. 
37 
Legal Aid Act 1969. 
38 Cowley above n 24, l. 
39 
Legal Services Act 1991. 
40 A Paterson "Financing Legal Services: A Comparative Perspective" in Goriely & Paterson above n 
7, 245. 
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Typically, the judicare system can be contrasted with the 'staff-model' of delivery. 
Thi s model features 'public sector' or 'salaried' lawyers being employed directly by 
the state to provide legal assistance to the poor. The staff-model system is thus 
known for its ability to save expense and to provide a more specialised service for 
poor litigants. However, it is also widely known for an inferior standard of legal 
service and an absence of the free right to choose counsel.41 Primarily, this model is 
used in jurisdictions such as the United States and Quebec. 
A combination of both the judicare and staff-model option is often referred to as a 
'mixed-welfare system ' . These are utilised in jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Canada and feature the staff-model being used to supplement the judicare scheme. 
Thus, in most situations the staff model works to cover legal matters for which the 
private profession has no experience, for example, legal advice to the poor and law 
reform in welfare matters .42 The staff-model is thus characterised here by its 
restricted scope of service and its inability to compete with private practitioners. By 
comparison, in jurisdictions such as England and New Zealand the staff model is 
partly represented by the use of community-based law centres. These utilise some 
paid staff to supply legal services but are by and large voluntary organisations. There 
is thus no genuine integration of the staff andjudicare models. 
Under the Legal Services Act 1991, New Zealand thus continues to utilise a classic 
'judicare' model. While this model is seen in many variations across the western 
world, there are certain characteristics that are commonly present. These 
characteristics, which range from the independent administration of the scheme to 
the requirement of contributions from applicants, all feature under the framework of 
New Zealand ' s 1991 Act. 
B The Independent Administration of Legal Aid 
4 1 
Paterson above n 40, 250. 
42 M Zander 'The First Wave ' in Mauro Cappelletti (ed) Access to Justice and the Welfare State 
(Sigthoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1981) 20. 
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Section 94 of the New Zealand Act authorises legal aid to be administered by an 
independent corporate body called the 'Legal Services Board' .43 The primary aims of 
this Board are to efficiently administer the granting of civil and criminal legal aid, 
and to ensure that the operation of the respective schemes are as inexpensive and as 
efficient as possible.44 
To carry out these objectives, the Legal Services Board receives government funding 
from Vote: Justice and distributes this amongst the various 'district legal services 
committees'. These committees, set up along the lines of district law societies, have 
the task of deciding how the funds will in fact be allocated in each particular 
district.45 The actual decision of whether or not the legal aid fund will be used in a 
particular case is left to 'district sub-committees' .46 
The sub-committees thus perform the bulk of the day-to-day legal aid administration. 
Comprising only volunteer practitioners, these committees consider the merits of 
each application for legal aid and, if they decide to provide assistance, will grant the 
applicant a total sum.47 Normally, this total sum will be based upon the Board's 
'Remuneration Instructions' which are revised every year by government directive. 
These Instructions indicate that the total sum is to be calculated by the set hourly rate 
for the particular lawyer, and then totalled according to the practitioner's estimate of 
the length of the case, the disbursements needed, the degree of urgency, and the 
complexity of the case. 48 
C Eligibility for Legal Aid 
Part I of the Act determines who may apply for legal aid. The eligibility criterion 
does however differ however according to whether the proceedings are civil or 
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, an applicant will be granted legal aid if, 
upon appearance in cou1t, the Registrar of the court decides that assistance would be 
43 Section 94 Legal Services Act 1991. 
44 Section 95( 1) Legal Services Act 1991. 
45 Section 115 Legal Services Act 1991. 
46 Where a case will involve large sums of money, the application is referred to the district committee. 
47 Sections 11 and 35 Legal Services Act 1991. 
48 Legal Services Board Civil and Criminal Legal Aid Remuneration Instructions (Wellington, 1999). 
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"desirable in the interests of justice".49 In exercising this discretion, the Registrar 
must consider the gravity of the offence and any other circumstances that the 
Registrar thinks are relevant.so Thus where the alleged offence is serious, the 
consequences of conviction will be detrimental to the accused and so it is more likely 
that he or she will receive assistance to ensure an adequate defence. A grant will also 
be in the interests of justice if the Registrar is satisfied that the applicant does not 
have 'sufficient means' to obtain legal assistance themselves.s 1 This concept of 
' sufficient means' will be satisfied if the applicant's disposable income or disposable 
capital is below a $2000 threshold.s2 
In the case of civil proceedings, legal aid is granted more as of right. Applications for 
legal assistance are made to district subcommittees who will make a grant if the 
applicant's disposable income or disposable capital does not exceed the $2000 
threshold.s3 The subcommittee may only refuse the application if either there are not 
reasonable grounds for taking or defending the proceedings; the applicant's chances 
of success do not justify the grant; the nature of the proceedings does not justify the 
grant of aid; or for any other reason it is unreasonable for the grant to be made.s4 
D The Scope of Legal Aid 
Part I of the Act also determines the situations in which an eligible person may apply 
for and receive legal aid. For criminal proceedings, section 4 states that legal aid may 
be granted to an applicant for any criminal proceedings which are heard in the 
Dist1ict Court, Youth Court, High Court, Court of Appeal or Privy Council.ss In a 
49 Section 7(l)(a) Legal Services Act 1991. 
50 Section 7 (2) Legal Services Act 1991. 
5 1 Section 7(l)(b) Legal Services Act 1991. 
52 Disposable income is calculated by taking an applicant ' s annual net tax-paid income and deducting 
a personal living allowance of $9841. Further deductions are allowed if the applicant has a partner or 
children. 
Disposable capital is calculated by taking the sum financial total of the applicant's capital and 
deducting the value of any vehicle, household furniture, contingent liabilities, unsecured debts, or the 
applicant's house if its value is less than $41 OOO. (Reg 36 Legal Services Regulations 1991). 
53 Section 28 Legal Services Act 1991. 
54 Section 34 Legal Services Act 1991. 
55 Section 4 Legal Services Act 1991. 
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similar vein, section 19 states that civil legal aid may be obtained for civil 
proceedings in any court of law or tribunal. 56 
E The Financial Contributions Required From Applicants 
Successful applicants for legal aid will, where possible, be required to make financial 
contributions to the Legal Services Board in the way of repaying their grant. For 
criminal legal aid this requirement is enforced at the discretion of the Registrar, yet 
an applicant will only normally be excused if the payment of such a contribution 
would cause hardship. 57 
For civil legal aid, the provision of assistance is more clearly in the way of a loan 
than a grant. Firstly, every applicant is required to pay an initial contribution of $50 
to the Board when applying for financial assistance.58 Secondly, an applicant will 
also be liable to the Board for further contributions until the grant/loan is repaid.59 To 
ensure that its funds are repaid, any property 'recovered or preserved' in the 
proceedings will be automatically subject to a charge owing to the board. 60 At its 
discretion, the Board may also impose a charge on any applicant ' s private property 
for the reason of recouping unpaid contributions.61 
F Lawyers' Remuneration for Legal Aid Work 
A cmrent feature of the legal aid system is that lawyers who undertake criminal or 
civil legal aid work are not remunerated at market rates. Rather, when a case is 
completed, the lawyer will forward a claim for fees and disbursements to the 
respective Registrar or district subcommittee. The lawyer's fees will then be 
determined by the Remuneration Instructions, which set similar hourly fixed rates of 
pay for both civil and criminal legal aid work. This rate will be dependent upon the 
56 Section 19 Legal Services Act 1991 . 
57 Section 8 Legal Services Act 1991. 
58 Unless there is hardship under section 37 of the Act or it is an application for an order under section 
49A Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
59 These further contributions are required at $1 for every $2 of disposable income for the first $1000 
of an applicant's disposab le income and $2 for every $3 of disposable income for the next $2000. 
After this, all income must go to repaying the Board. 
60 Section 40( l) Legal Services Act 1991. 
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level of experience of the individual practitioner and the level of the court in which 
the case was heard. As an example, a lawyer with eight years experience who 
conducts a criminal or civil case in the High Court can expect to be paid $150 an 
hour.62 
Additionally, it is important to note that in certain civil cases , the hourly rate will 
only be paid for a certain length of time. That is, proceedings under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 ,63 and most family law cases as well, have a capped time period 
for which a lawyer can charge. In an application for an occupancy order under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 197664 for example, the lawyer has a maximum of 6 paid 
hours to conduct the client's case. 65 The reason for this limitation is clearly to cut 
down on the maximum amounts lawyers can claim for individual cases. 
G Community Law Centres 
As alluded to before, the need for legal advice and information in New Zealand has 
never been addressed by the government ' s legal aid schemes. Unfortunately, this is a 
crucial requirement for helping the poor identify legal solutions to their problems and 
thus to utilise the state assistance scheme. In the past, the poor' s need for legal 
information and advice has thus fallen on the shoulders of volunteer agencies like the 
New Zealand Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux and other specialised 
groups.66 
It is only since the early 1980s that 'community law centres ' have developed in the 
major cities to specifically address the lack of legal knowledge in society. Essentially 
comprising the volunteer work of local practitioners, these centres provide free legal 
advice and information to members of the public on a wide variety of legal matters. 
Since the 1991 legislation, the government has recognised the importance of these 
centres in meeting its access to justice obligations. They have thus ensured their 
61 Section 40(2) Legal Services Act 1991. 
62 Remuneration Instructions above n 48. 
63 Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
64 Matimonial Property Act 1976. 
65 Remuneration Instructions above n 48 . 
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continued funding by giving the Board 'first call ' on the New Zealand Law Society's 
'Special Fund' .67 This Special Fund, created under the Law Practitioners Act 198268, 
comprises the total monetary interest generated from all solicitor trust accounts 
across the country. This certainty of funding has led to the establishment of nineteen 
current law centres spread throughout New Zealand which meet the information and 
advice needs of the community. 69 
H Other Schemes 
The Legal Services Act also provides for the 'duty solicitor scheme'. This scheme is 
designed to meet a criminal defendant's need for 'instant' representation on their first 
appearance in court.70 Duty solicitors are thus imbued with the role of advising 
defendants as to their plea (including whether to exercise their right to elect a jury), 
how to arrange private representation or obtain criminal legal aid, and how to arrange 
bail. 
V THE CURRENT FISCAL CRISIS 
Initially, as a matter of meeting its own objectives, the Legal Aid system seemed to 
be working well. A review of the system in 1993 by a specially appointed 'legal aid 
committee ' found that the Act was achieving its aim of providing those of 
insufficient means with access to the law.7 1 A more comprehensive study undertaken 
by the Legal Services Board in 1995 found that with respect to criminal legal aid, 
88% of those granted aid were unemployed, while 79% were receiving a benefit.72 
The study thus concluded that the Board was achieving its objective of targeting the 
needy and providing them with an opportunity to have their rights heard. 73 
66 For example, Victim Support Groups and Women 's Refuges. 
67 Section 9 lF Law Practitioners Act 1980. 
68 Law Practitioners Act 1980. 
69 Morris above n 23, 110. 
70 Section 156 Legal Services Act 1991. 
7 1 Legal Services Committee Review of the Legal Services Act 1991 (Wellington, 1993). 
72 Legal Services Board In the Interests of Justice - an evaluation of Criminal legal Aid in New 
Zealand (Wellington, 1995). 
73 Interests of Justice above n 72, 131. 
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In recent times however, the fiscal demands of the legal aid scheme have placed it in 
a state of crisis. Some authors in particular are of the opinion that the earlier 
optimism shown by Cappelletti & Garth of a worldwide access to justice movement 
has been replaced in most jurisdictions by a feeling of pessimism. For example, from 
as early as 1983, Zemans commented on the limited funding of legal services in all 
nations and the gradual restrictions imposed on their eligibility and scope.74 
Likewise, Goriely & Paterson now assert that in almost every country with a 
developed legal aid programme the same conclusion has been reached - legal aid is 
too expensive.
75 
They therefore state that while the containment of expenditure has 
always been an important policy for legal aid, it can now be seen as an overriding 
objective. 
This has been the attitude in New Zealand in recent times . Over the past two decades, 
expenditure on legal aid has grown enormously. Figures in 1980/1981 showed legal 
aid expenditure to be at $3.6m.76 This rose to $36m in 1991 , and most recently to 
$94m in the 1998-1999 year. 77 There has thus been genuine concern from the public 
and politicians for this growing depletion of taxpayer monies. 
The media in particular have sought to lay blame for these burgeoning costs. In 
particular, they have focused their attention on the enormous sums paid out annually 
for the defence of individual citizens. Examples of this include the $385,000 awarded 
to convicted paedophile Peter Ellis for his various court appearances, and the 
$359,000 lost when "a Maori woman unsuccessfully brought a fisheries case before 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee".78 
The media have also focused on the high salaries that have been collected by 
individual lawyers for their legal aid work. For example, a successful and prolonged 
campaign in 1999 enabled lawyers ' legal aid income to be publicly disclosed, and 
revealed one prominent Auckland lawyer, Peter Kaye, to have received $416,645 
74 Frederick Zemans "Recent Trends in the Organisation of Legal Services" ( 1991) 11 Queen ' s LJ 26, 
43. 
75 Goriely & Paterson above n 7, 20. 
76 Access to the Law above n 36, 18. 
77 Legal Services Board Annual Reports 1990-1991 and 1998-1999 (Wellington). 
78 "$385,000 for Ellis" Th e Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 23 March 2000, 3 and "$359,000 for 
Maori Legal Aid Case" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 20 November 1999, 2 . 
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from the legal aid fund in the 1998-1999 year.79 At least another 100 lawyers were 
stated to have picked up more than $200,000 each. 
In light of this media attention on huge public spending, the present government has 
gone to great lengths to cap future expenditure on legal aid at the budget for the 
1999-2000 year. As a matter of general policy, this move is by no means unexpected. 
Over the past few decades, dissatisfaction has arisen with the fiscal demands of the 
welfare state and its assurances of a measure of well-being for all citizens.so Thus 
most social services today like health and housing are undergoing significant cost 
cut-backs. Additionally, governments are removing themselves from the welfare 
process and are instead concentrating on developing 'mixed welfare' or 'pluralist' 
systems through which all sectors of society share the responsibility for delivering 
welfare.s1 
In New Zealand's current social climate of the decline from the welfare state, cost 
cut-backs can thus be expected. Unfortunately, as some commentators argue, the 
problem for legal aid is that this retreat from universal welfare provision heralds an 
inevitable increase in demand for its state-funded legal assistance. Tamara Goriely, 
for example, maintains that as the government withdraws from welfare delivery in 
today's welfare state, there is an increasing emphasis on individual legal rights.s2 
This is shown by the fact that the state ceases to have control over complaints in 
public services and instead, individuals are given the right to bring judicial review of 
many public sector decisions.s3 The emphasis now is thus on individuals pursuing 
their grievances through the courts rather than relying on state regulation. This means 
that there will be an increasing reliance on legal aid schemes to effect these civil and 
social rights. 
79 "Earnings List Released" ( 1999) 523 Lawtalk l. 
80 Jonathan Boston "New Zealand's Welfare State in Transition" in Boston et al (eds) Redesigning the 
Welfare State in New Zealand (1999) 3. 
81 Judith Healy Welfare Options: Delivering Social Services (Allen & Unwin, NSW, 1998) viii. 
82 Goriel y, above n 31. 
83 In New Zealand this can be seen with increasing rights to challenge providers of health care. See 
Mental Health Act 1992. Also emphasis on individual rights shown by Children, Young Persons & 
Their Families Act 1989 and Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
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In addition to this inexorable rise in legal aid claims, there are also other factors 
which are increasing the demand upon the scheme. The continual growth of 
legislation for example will afford more rights to the poor and thus more possible 
claims for legal assistance. The Domestic Violence Act 199584 for instance, which 
has been enacted to give legal protection to partners from abuse in their domestic 
relationship, is expected to add another $6m to the legal aid budget for the 1999-
2000 year. Another factor is the increasing rate of unemployment. As more and more 
people lose their source of income, they also lose their ability to acquire legal 
services through the private market. There will thus be more pressure on the legal aid 
scheme to enable access to justice for these people. 
Clearly then, the increasing need for legal aid at a time when financial resources are 
limited creates serious issues. In times of high demand, registrars and district sub-
committees may be pressured to prioritise their granting of legal assistance, while 
litigants will be forced to show that their case is more deserving of assistance than 
others. 85 The result would thus appear to be not access to the law for all citizens, but 
access for only those citizens who have suffered a serious breach of their legal rights. 
In defence, the government has stated at all times that it cannot maintain an open 
chequebook for legal services. 86 Just as for any social service like housing or 
healthcare, it must balance priorities, weighing the cost of legal services against the 
gravity of their need. In doing so however, the government does accept that it cannot 
undermine the fundamental right of access to justice. Politicians at this time are thus 
looking for ways in which low-cost legal services can be delivered to the poor 
without undermining their right to equal justice. The government's present and 
proposed attempts are examined below. 
VI CUTS TO LA WYERS' REMUNERATION RATES 
84 Domestic Violence Act 1995 . 
85 This is currently a concern with the English Legal Aid system. See Michael Zander "Twelve 
Reasons for Rejecting the Legal Aid Paper" 1995 NU 1098. 
86 Stephen Zindel "Legal Aid Refoms Announced" (1999) 514 Lawtalk 12. 
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The government's first method for bringing down the costs of legal aid has been to 
reduce remuneration rates for lawyers. In 1998, the government directed the Legal 
Services Board to reduce lawyer' s set hourly rates for civil and criminal legal aid 
work by 10%.87 Further in September 1999, the Board's Legal Aid Remuneration 
Instructions again reduced lawyer's hourly rates, this time by 13%, with travel rates 
being reduced by 25 %. Significantly, the Board also reduced the number of paid 
hours for which a lawyer could complete certain civil cases. 88 
This move has been by no means surprising and has been brought about to a large 
extent by the media attention on lawyers ' annual incomes from legal aid work. As a 
consequence of this, there have been allegations that lawyers are taking an "easy and 
unmerited ride at the taxpayer' s expense". 89 The public and politicians have thus 
successfully called for remuneration rates to be reduced. 
So far, these cuts have definitely worked to reduce the costs of legal aid. From the 
1998-1999 to the 1999-2000 year, the average cost per case of civil legal aid has 
dropped from $800 to $625.90 The success of these cuts over the last two years and 
the continuing cost-saving attitude may thus mean that further cuts are in order. This 
however raises serious questions concerning the sacrifices that are to be expected of 
the legal profession and the impact it might have on the quality of service for legally 
aided litigants. In light of the need to ensure equal access to justice, should cuts to 
lawyers ' remuneration rates be made at all? Are lawyers are valid source for cost-
savings to the legal aid scheme? 
A Arguments Against Lawyers' Fee Reduction 
1 Providing legal services to the poor is a responsibility of the state 
A popular argument against penalising lawyers arises from the fact that 
fundamentally, legal aid is a social service. As such it should be the state's 
87 Legal Services Board Civil Legal Aid Remuneration Instructions 1998, (l August 1998). 
88 Legal Services Board Civil Legal Aid Remuneration Instructions 1999, ( I September 1999). 
89 See Jock Anderson "NBR 's Spirited Campaign Speeds Up Reform of Legal Aid Scheme" National 
Business Review 8 October 1999, 3. 
90 "New Instructions Cut Legal Aid Rates Again" (1999) 520 Lawtalk 1. 
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responsibility to see that this system has the financial resources to meet its 
objectives. 91 In doing so, the state fulfils its obligations to ensure access to justice for 
all citizens and, as with housing and healthcare, to provide a modest level of social 
well-being for all citizens. 
Lawyers would thus argue that universal access to justice is no concern of theirs. 
Why should they have a responsibility to ensure a civil and social right? Duncan 
Webb raises the point that builders do not have a responsibility to ensure adequate 
housing, nor doctors a duty to ensure affordable healthcare. Thus, when the state's 
financial resources become limited, it should not be the profession's job to make 
sacrifices to ensure legal aid's continued provision. Rather, the costs of legal aid 
should be borne equitably by all citizens and not by lawyers alone.92 By reducing 
remuneration for lawyers, the government has opted out of responsibility and forced 
the Legal Services Board to pursue unjustified avenues for relieving its financial 
burdens. 
2 Lower rates lead to a lesser quality of legal aid work 
The New Zealand Law Society raises the most fundamental concern with fee 
reductions . It maintains that the gradual reductions in remuneration are persuading 
senior lawyers to forsake legal aid work for the rewards of private practice.93 The 
inevitable result of this is that young, inexperienced lawyers are becoming prevalent 
amongst legal aid litigation. This, they say, is having disastrous effects for the quality 
of legal service provided for poor litigants, and thus for the achievement of equal 
access to justice in New Zealand. 
Recent evidence would suggest that these claims are not pure fantasy. A 1997 study 
of 439 New Zealand lawyers, conducted by Gabrielle Maxwell at Victoria University 
of Wellington, revealed that the majority of 'moderately experienced lawyers' 
91 This argument is made in D Webb "Why should poor people get free lawyers?" (1998) 28 VUWLR 
65, 75. 
92 Webb above n 91, 76. 
93 Ian Haynes "Legal Aid Stance Misconstrued" (1999) 530 Lawtalk 1, 2. 
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believed their fees to be 'slightly inadequate' .94 Importantly however, the majority of 
'senior lawyers' reported remuneration levels to be best expressed as 'very 
inadequate'. The continuing cuts in remuner~tion since this study was conducted 
would suggest that these attitudes have worsened. Consequently, this may very well 
mean that for the most experienced lawyers, the rates of pay act may as a deterrent to 
undertaking legal aid work. 
Unfortunately, this quality issue has been exacerbated by a recent reduction in the 
number of paid hours for family Jaw cases. As of this year for example, a typical 
application for a separation order under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 will permit 
a lawyer a maximum of 4 hours, instead of the usual 8, to wrap up his or her client's 
case.95 Lawyers thus have Jess time to conduct a case in an area which is known to be 
pa11icularly time consuming and labour intensive. The consequence of this is that it 
will be harder, particularly for women, to obtain protection, as they are the most 
frequent users of legal aid in these areas. 96 
To take the problem even further, the Ethics Committee appears to have recognised 
the shortcomings of these legal aid pay rates. Traditionally, the Barristers and 
Solicitors Rules of Professional Conduct have imposed a duty upon lawyers to accept 
any client's instructions unless that practitioner has no time or is incompetent in the 
relevant area of Jaw. 97 This rule has always ensured that poor people could not be 
unreasonably turned down in their quest for legal services and is thus influential in 
allowing poor litigants to retain the same lawyer as any other member of society. 
However, due to the low remuneration rates at present, the committee has proposed 
that clause 3.01 be added to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.01 states: 98 
94 G Maxwell Legal Aid Remuneration: Practitioner's Views (Legal Services Board, Wellington, 
1997) 
95 Remuneration Instructions above n 48, 23. 
96 This point is made by Naomi Larkin 'Battered Wives Will Pay' New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
New Zealand, 10 April 1999, l. 
97 New Zealand Law Society Rules of Professional Conduct for Barristers and Solicitors (4th ed, 
Wellington, 1996) Rule 1.02. 
98 "Ethics Committee Proposed New Rules: Legal Aid" (1999) 520 Lawtalk l, 2. 
"a practitioner may decline to act where the client is legally aided if the 
practitioner believes: (a) the legal aid rate or the likely legal aid rate is not 
fair 
remuneration; 
(b) the grant of legal aid in the particular case has been 
capped at an unacceptably low figure. 
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This clause appears to allow lawyers to effectively refuse their representative 
services to poor litigants. Obviously, the Ethics Committee merely recognises the 
fact that lawyers should not be forced to accept a lower level of remuneration when 
there are more rewarding opportunities elsewhere. This is perhaps then the harsh 
commercial reality of today's legal world. 
Unfortunately, the lawyers likely to thus utilise this clause will be the ones of 
experience that have more remunerable private work available. The remaining 
lawyers will not then accurately reflect the legal services available to other citizens 
through the private market. Consequently, there is thus a very real threat to the 
standard of legal representation for poor people in society. It seems that the benefit of 
the legal aid system in allowing any man on the street to have the best lawyer might 
thus be eroded by the government's cost-cutting attitude. 
3 Only penalising certain lawyers 
Another objection to making lawyers bear the brunt of cost-cuts is that it is only 
certain lawyers who undertake legal aid work. This is shown by the Maxwell study 
mentioned above which highlighted that the average contributions from lawyers to 
the job of legal aid ranged from 7% of their normal workload to over 80%.99 What 
this suggests is that the new cuts will penalise some lawyers more than others. 
Clearly, this does not fit with the traditional responsibility upon the profession as a 
whole to provide for the legal needs of the poor without reward. 
99 Maxwell above n 23, 6. 
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4 Already significant contributions made by lawyers 
The New Zealand Law Society maintains that the current cuts ask too much of the 
Jaw profession. Even before the recent series of pay cuts in 1998 and 1999, lawyers 
were already contributing a great deal to the needs of the poor as a significant 
disparity existed between legal aid pay rates and those received for private 
practice. 100 Notably, this was partly due to the fact that lawyers would only charge 
85% of their usual fee for legal aid work. The present fixed rates and capping of 
hours clearly represents a substantial move from this position. 
Additionally, many lawyers already make significant contributions through their 
voluntary work for community law centres. This commitment is not a requirement of 
the profession, yet many lawyers throughout the country regularly give up their time 
to give citizens free legal advice and information. Significantly, lawyers are also well 
represented in citizens' advice bureaux and, of course, the district subcommittees 
which administer the grants of legal aid. 
The Law Society would also argue that a further significant contribution is made 
through its donation of the interest on solicitors' trust accounts to the Law Society's 
Special Fund. This is used primarily by the Legal Services Board to fund community 
law centres and educational packages so that society is more aware of the law. Many 
lawyers already see this as a sufficient financial contribution to the needs of the 
poor. IOI 
5 The real costs of legal aid are unavoidable 
Perhaps the strongest argument against fee reductions for lawyers is that they are not 
responsible for the burgeoning costs of the legal aid system. Rather, rising costs are 
the results of inevitable and uncontrollable factors which feature in New Zealand's 
modern legal system. 102 These factors include the new legislation brought in each 
year which entitles people to claim for legal aid and thus increases demands upon the 
100 Cowley above n 24, 1. 
101 Benedict Birnberg "Community Legal Service" (1997) October NLJ 1559. 
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system. One example of this, as stated earlier, is the recent Domestic Violence Act 
1995 which is expected to add another $6m to the budget for legal aid. 103 Another 
factor is the gradual trend toward the use of expensive expert evidence, for example 
DNA technologies, which drive up the cost of litigation and consequently the size of 
grants. Finally, rising costs are also more a result of haphazard events like the Scott 
Watson and John Barlow trials which have required sustained financing over a long 
period of time. 
Proponents of this argument therefore suggest that what the Legal Services Board 
should be concentrating on is new innovative ways to reduce court costs and to thus 
make the whole legal system less expensive. 104 This echoes claims from the legal 
profession that the funding of legal aid has simply not kept pace with legislative 
change and thus to cope with funding pressures the Legal Services Board has had to 
unjustifiably penalise lawyers. 105 
B Arguments For Lawyers' Fee Reduction 
1 The contractualist view 
The contractualist view 1s the oldest and most popular argument for requmng 
lawyers to make sacrifices when servicing the poor. This argument's essential claim 
is that there is an implied contract between the state and lawyers through which 
certain rights and benefits flow. Under this contract lawyers enjoy a monopoly over 
the exercise of legal services in society from which they reap substantial monetary 
rewards and a high status in the community. 106 As part of their expectation of these 
benefits however, lawyers have a reciprocal responsibility to meet the community's 
expectation of competence, public protection, and access to the law. This expectation 
102 See "Legal Aid system requires innovation rather than curbs" The Daily News, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 6 October 1999, 10. 
103 'Budget Blowout for Legal Aid' The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 10 March 2000. 
104 'Budget Blowout' above n 103. 
105 John Rowan 'Inferior Aid Advice Likely Say Lawyers' The Dominion Wellington, New Zealand, 
13 April 2000, 6. 
106 Although in recent times there have been signs that this monopoly is under threat. For example the 
Conveyancers Bill 1998 proposes to allow a separate profession to undertake property transactions. 
29 
was emphasised as early as 1925 by England's Lawrence Committee when it 
wrote: 107 
"there exists a moral obligation on the part of the profession, in return for 
the monopoly in the practice of law which it enjoys, to render gratuitous 
legal assistance to those members of the community who cannot afford to 
pay for such assistance, provided that no undue burden is thereby cast upon 
any individual member of the profession." 
Clearly then, these reciprocal responsibilities have been the spur for the early 
charitable movement which saw lawyers offering free advice and representation to 
the poor. There has thus always been an aspect of tradition in the acceptance of 
sacrifices by the profession. In more recent times, this has been highlighted by one of 
New Zealand's own High Court judges. In Darvell v Auckland District Legal 
Services Subcommittee, where a practitioner appealed against a district subcommittee 
to obtain adequate remuneration for his legal services, Williams J found in favour of 
the award made by the district committee, stating that there was: 108 
"an important and longstanding professional tradition that counsel should 
acknowledge some obligation to undertake legal aid briefs and in so doing 
accept that a sacrifice in terms of their usual remuneration is involved". 
This statement holds strongly in light of the fact that the legal profession has 
previously committed itself to a partnership effort with the government, despite the 
latter's control of assisting the poor through the legal aid system. When the Legal 
Aid Act was enacted in 1969, it was agreed that on the one hand the government 
would meet the costs of legal aid by providing the funding for needy litigants, while 
in return, the profession would provide its services to the government at a reduced 
rate. 109 Additionally, lawyers were to ensure that they would cater for all the cases 
brought to them by those of insufficient means. This partnership agreement cannot be 
forgotten in these times of financial pressure. 
107 Lawrence Committee (1925) in Law Society Solicitors Serving Society (Law Society, London, 
1995). 
108 Darvell v Auckland District Legal Services Subcommittee [1993) I NZLR 111, 120 per Williams J. 
30 
2 A higher duty to preserve the legal system 
In addition to the duties owed to the community under the contractualist view, it may 
also be argued that lawyers have a duty to preserve the legal system itself. 110 That is, 
in being imbued with a monopoly power to profit from the practice and exercise of 
the law, lawyers must also be concerned with upholding and maintaining the 
integrity of the legal system. The idea is thus that in benefiting from the privileges of 
the legal system, a lawyer must be ready to protect its values. Importantly, these 
values will only be upheld if access to the law is enabled for all and thus it becomes a 
responsibility for every lawyer, as part of the wider profession, to lend his or her 
services to those who cannot obtain services through normal financial means. 
C An Alternative Approach 
Overall, arguments of contractualism, tradition and partnership are very persuasive in 
suggesting that some effort is required from the legal profession to assist in meeting 
the needs of the poor. If this is not to take the form of pure charity work, then at least 
some subsidisation of fees is required. However, where is the limit for such 
requirements? Lawyers can argue that it cannot condone further pay reductions and 
that it is in fact the government which is abstaining from its responsibilities for 
servicing the poor. 
Unfortunately, the public remains unsympathetic to the plight of lawyers. As one 
commentator has said, "before grief-stricken briefs weep into their Bloody Marys, 
they need to reflect on just exactly who the taxpayer is helping - clients, not 
lawyers". 111 While this might be the case, legal aid operates in the context of the 
above average salaries of the legal profession. Thus while salaries may still have 
room for reduction, it must be remembered that as long as private work is available, 
lawyers will be encouraged by the low remuneration and Ethics Committee's 
proposals to move to this more lucrative source of work. Unfortunately, this will 
109 Nicolette Levy Current Issues in Legal Aid (LLM Research Paper, Wellington, 1989). 
110 Webb above n 91, 88. 
111 Anderson above n 89. 
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pose serious problems for the quality of legally aided representation and will actually 
cause barriers to equal justice. 
Thus the answer does not lie in reducing remuneration. Doing so merely leads to a 
lower quality of service and imposes sacrifices inequitably amongst the profession. 
Therefore, what perhaps needs to be done is to keep legal aid remuneration rates at a 
reasonable level, and instead to require a greater contribution from the profession as 
a whole towards the plight of the poor. 
It is thus submitted that an American type obligation be introduced to the Law 
Society's rules of Professional Conduct. In the United States, the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that every lawyer should 
aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono legal services each year. 112 It then states 
that the majority of this pro bono work should be provided to those of limited means, 
or to charitable, educational or religious organisations. Although these rules are 
merely guidelines and have no legal force, they are being given effect by several 
large US companies like Ford and First Union who are refusing to hire lawyers who 
cannot provide evidence of meeting these requirements. 113 
In New Zealand, a similar rule should be introduced for the situation of legal aid 
work. Lawyers can thus be required to spend a certain number of hours each year 
doing legal aid work at its moderately reduced rates. In the event that lawyers are 
unwilling to put aside lucrative private practice for this, it is also submitted that they 
be able to 'buy-out' of their obligation by contributing a compensatory sum to the 
Legal Services Board. In this way, the responsibility is not simply a moral and thus 
unenforceable duty. It can be noted that in Ontaiio, a mandatory levy of £83 is 
imposed on each lawyer for legal aid work and this brings in a total of £2 million per 
annum. 114 Similar revenue would be sorely needed by New Zealand's struggling 
scheme and would ensure that all lawyers are contributing to the legal aid system, 
and hence to their obligation for the poor. 
112 American Bar Association American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(United States, 1999). 
113 Greg Winter 'Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor' The New York Times New 
York, United States of America, 17 August 2000. 
114 Paterson, above n 40, 239. 
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Significantly though, a problem in New Zealand would of course be the enactment of 
such a measure. While the Council of the New Zealand Law Society has the power 
under section 17 of the Law Practitioners' Act to make rules concerning the conduct 
of its members, the drafting of new rules is typically done by the Ethics Committee. 
And typically, the Committee will consult the whole profession on any proposed rule 
changes. 115 It is thus uncertain whether New Zealand lawyers would vote for such a 
move. Clearly, legal aid lawyers would be in support of a shifting of the financial 
responsibility for serving the poor to the whole profession. However, because legally 
aided work is a minority practice, it is unlikely that such a rule would be 
supported. 116 
Nevertheless it is submitted that the legal profession must make some move to see 
that the needs of the poor are further provided for. Otherwise, it may mean that the 
government takes unjustified and undesirable moves to save costs in the delivery of 
legal aid, and may even go so far as to take control of the delivery of legal services in 
New Zealand. Positive action from the whole profession is thus necessary for 
lawyers to ensure that the proper steps are taken in the maintenance of access to 
justice. As Graham Cowley, retired president of the Legal Services Board, has 
pointed out, it is the failure of practitioners as a whole to perpetuate the traditional 
willingness to provide accessible services to the public that has in fact put the whole 
I l 'd · k 117 ega ai system at ns . 
VII THE LEGAL SERVICES BILL 2000 
As a further answer to the financial problems of legal aid, the government has drafted 
the Legal Services Bill 2000. Set to come into force on 1 July, this Bill seeks to 
introduce a new framework for the state's system of legal assistance that emphasises 
improved administration, accountability, and efficiency. 118 Primarily, these goals will 
115 See for example the consultation for Rule 3.01 in Lawtalk above n 98. 
116 The Maxwell study above n 94 suggests a third of lawyers have Legal Aid as their major workload. 
117 Cowley above n 24, l. 
118 See Explanatory Note to Legal Services Bill 2000. 
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be effected through a new Legal Services Agency which will replace the current 
Legal Services Board and its subsidiaries. 119 
In general, the 'Legal Services Agency' will have the same functions and role that 
the Legal Services Board possessed. The major difference for the Agency however is 
that it will maintain the sole overall control of legal aid through supervising its 
distribution nationwide. By centralising legal aid in this way some consistency and 
certainty might be attained in the granting of assistance across the districts of New 
Zealand. Additionally, lawyers, or 'legal service providers', will be able to be 
monitored and controlled to ensure they are being remunerated correctly and working 
at acceptable standards. 120 
Phrases such as 'improved administration' and 'efficiency' are thus the cornerstones 
of the new Bill. This reflects the view that in the modem welfare state, the 
government's role is not necessarily to provide all social provision, but merely to 
organise and to regulate it efficiently and fairly. 121 Consequently the Bill does not 
attempt to address the overarching cost problems of legal aid and its effects on access 
to justice. The Bill does however provide for the trial of two pilot programmes which 
may prove to be solutions for legal aid's problems in the future. 
A Trial 1: The Public Defender Scheme 
Under the Legal Services Bill, the Legal Services Agency intends running a 'public-
defenders' office in one New Zealand city. 122 These offices, typically employed 
overseas, are run by the state and employ salaried lawyers to carry out all the 
criminal defence work for which legal aid is normally claimed. Upon appearance in 
court, a state-employed 'public defender', instead of a selected private practitioner, 
will thus automatically represent the accused. 
Public defender schemes do feature overseas in jurisdictions such as Australia and 
the United States. They have also been introduced as a pilot programme in Scotland 
119 Clause 77 Legal Services Bill 2000. 
iw Tony Ryal! above n 3. 
12 1 Pat Shannon Social Policy (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991). 
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under the Crime and Punishment Bill. 123 However, the use of these schemes in these 
countries has had a mixed reception. It will thus be useful to look at the costs and 
benefits of such a model. 
1 Advantages of the Public Defender scheme 
One advantage of the public defender scheme is that it allows for the use of the staff-
model of delivery for legal aid. In New Zealand, this has been strongly discouraged 
by the Law Society who value their autonomy and independence in distributing legal 
services. 124 However, experts on delivery systems for legal aid argue that the staff or 
'public-sector' model can provide a valuable counterbalance to the costs and benefits 
f . h . d' I~ o using t e JU 1care system. 
For example, by working salaried staff on specific areas of law, these lawyers are 
likely to generate a significant area of expertise in the criminal law and in defending 
criminal offenders. Consequently, poor litigants can arguably be assured at least the 
same or higher quality of service from the scheme's specialised, experienced staff. 
Here in New Zealand, this can perhaps be illustrated by Meredith Connell, a private 
Auckland law firm, which has developed an excellent reputation in acting solely as 
prosecutors for the Crown. 126 
Obviously though, the main advantage of the public defender scheme is that it will 
allow the government to rein in lawyer's access to the open-ended taxpayer 
chequebook. Lawyers will be paid on a salaried system and will work only in a 
particular district or field of criminal law. Thus they will not be able to take on board 
a large number of cases at once which calls to doubt their resulting quality. 
Australian studies have shown that salaiied staff cost at least half of that when using 
. . . . I 121 pnvate pract1t1oners at sess10na rates. 
122 Tony Ryall, above n 3. 
123 Ian Hart 'Reforming the System' (1998) May NLJ 1402. 
124 See "Public Defender's Office Could Cap Legal Aid" New Zealand Herald, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 4 August 1999, 7. 
125 Zander above n 42, 22. 
126 "Public Defender's" above n 124, 7. 
127 N.S.W Public Solicitor Public Defenders in Access to the Law above n 36, 137. 
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2 Disadvantages of the Public Defender scheme 
Despite these benefits of a public defender system, there is strong criticism for this 
scheme worldwide. In particular, where they are used in the United States, Canada, 
and some Australian states, there are doubts concerning the quality of public the 
defender counsel. For example, the United States programmes have been recently 
commented on by Marcel Berlins who is of the opinion that public defenders are 
either young, idealistic and boring and grow up to be highly paid trial lawyers in 
private practice, or they are cynical, seedy deadbeats and losers, badly dressed, 
always smoking, with a history of drink and bad relationships. 128 The reason for this 
negative view of public defender counsel is that the lower salaried pay in these 
schemes attracts only the inexperienced and substandard lawyers. Consequently, 
public defenders are often considered a poor equivalent to the private system or 
judicare model. 
More specifically however, the difference in quality between private and public 
defender counsel has been the subject of many empirical studies in the United States. 
Many of these studies have been disparaging of the public defender system. For 
example, one Indiana study found that whereas 70% of clients of court-appointed 
counsel who went to trial were convicted, only 49% of the defendants who retained 
private counsel were convicted. 129 Likewise, a Pennsylvanian report concluded that 
the clients of private lawyers were much less likely to be convicted or receive jail 
sentences than were defendants represented by public defenders. 130 
There is however opposition to these findings. A more recent study hints that the 
above results are due to the fact that public defender clients tend to be younger, 
poorer, more heavily min01ity, and charged with more serious offences than clients 
who retained private counsel. 131 Consequently, this summary of more accurate 
128 Marcel Berlins "Who's Afraid of the Public Defender?" (1997) Nov NLJ 1629. 
129 Bodensteiner, Bork & Moskowitz Unequal Justice Under Law: An Analysis of Indigents in the 
Criminal Justice System - The Indiana Experience (1983) 6 W.New Eng. L.Rev. 263, 296. 
130 Wettick, A Study of the Assignment of Judges to Criminal Cases in Alleghany County- The Poor 
Fare Worse (1970) 9 Duq.L.Rev. 51, 65. 
131 Floyd Feeney & Patrick Jackson "Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does 
the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?" (1991) 22 Rutgers L J 361. 
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studies has found that there is essentially no difference on any measure of results 
between public defenders and private lawyers. 
While empirical evidence is thus inconclusive, a significant fact is that in all studies 
the defendants themselves rated their private lawyers more highly than public 
defenders. 132 By and large, this is thought to be because of the greater consultation 
time involved with private lawyers .133 Public defenders tend to fail in keeping their 
clients' informed of developments and case particulars. Greater client satisfaction 
was therefore seen in private lawyers and defendants thus preferred selecting their 
own attorneys through a judicare scheme. Retaining the judicare scheme may thus be 
important for maintaining defendants' confidence in the law profession, and in the 
justice system itself. 
Perhaps the biggest concern however for proponents of access to justice is the loss of 
the ability to have a lawyer of personal choice in public defender schemes. Under the 
current system, poor litigants may retain the litigation services of any lawyer who 
has the time and knowledge to take on the case. However, under the public defender 
scheme the defendant will instead be serviced by one of the staff from the public 
defender ' s office who is best able to deal with the accused' s particular 
circumstances. 
The obvious problem then is that the accused may be denied the services of a lawyer 
with which he or she has a good pre-existing relationship. This particular lawyer will 
be accustomed to dealing with the accused' s behaviour and with the background of 
their alleged offence. Consequently, being assigned representation by the court 
would heavily disadvantage the poor litigant. This is especially so if the litigant is a 
minority as they may acquire lawyers who have no understanding of them, their 
background, their language, or their inherent disadvantages . 134 
It is no surprise then that the Women ' s Access to Justice Report has noted women 
were only slightly concerned with having a lawyer of skill and experience. Rather, 
132 Feeney above n 131, 382. 
133 Feeney above n 131, 382. 
134 Morris above n 23, 107. 
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they saw it as more essential that they have a lawyer they can choose for his or her 
personal qualities, someone they could confide in and trust, and who had particular 
personal knowledge and skills. 135 This would enable effective interaction with the 
lawyer as "Effective interaction ... depends on the lawyer's awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, the client ' s values , experiences and needs." 136 Unfortunately, these 
important factors may be lost under a public defender scheme. 
3 Conclusion 
Evidence from overseas jurisdictions thus suggests that while public defender 
schemes may indeed be cost-effective, their quality of service is in doubt. Add to this 
the loss of the right to counsel of choice and a public defender scheme may not be 
desirable at this present time. However, it is encouraging at to see that the 
government is at least piloting the method to observe what results it brings in New 
Zealand. 
Indeed, the use of the public defender scheme may yet prove worthwhile. It has been 
noted that the problems which arise in the United States are really a result of the 
gross underfunding which their schemes receive. 137 An optimistic view has thus been 
adopted by Stephen O'Driscoll , chairman of our Legal Services Board, who 
acknowledges that a public defender scheme may just work if it attracts high-quality 
lawyers at appropriate remuneration. 138 This view is similar to England's Justice 
Report, which recommends making public defender representation optional if 
adequate scales of remuneration can be maintained. 139 This would then ensure that 
the scheme would be staffed by lawyers of extensive practical experience, 
commitment, and expertise, who have the resources to mount effective defences. 
Unfortunately, if the public defender system is to be introduced as a cost-saving 
measure in New Zealand, it is unlikely that remuneration levels would be high. 
Unless there is a greater volume of cases heard through the scheme the same limited 
135 Morris above n 23, 108. 
136 Morris above n 23, 108. 
137 Berlins above n 128, l. 
138 "Public Defender's" above n 124, l. 
139 Justice above n 35, 32. 
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source of funds would be utilised it is thus unlikely that it would be financially 
successful. Really, in terms of saving costs, the government should remember that it 
is not the criminal cases which suck up most of legal aid's funding. Rather, civil 
cases contribute to most of the ballooning budget and it is to this that the government 
should be directing its energies. 
B Trial 2: Block Contracts 
Block contracts are the second of the Bill's innovations for Legal Aid. Through 
clause 74 of the Bill, the Legal Services Agency has the power to enter into a bulk 
funding agreement with any individual lawyer or firm. 140 Under this agreement, the 
respective lawyer or firm will essentially be paid a lump sum in return for providing 
legal aid services to all the poor in a particular geographical district or field of law. 141 
I Advantages of Block Contracting 
The benefits of such a scheme are obvious. By working under a fixed budget, the 
government will not be offering an open chequebook to legal aid applicants and 
lawyers. Instead, the legal service providers will shoulder the risk that the population 
will actually require more legal services than what was predicted by the lump sum. 
Depending on the accuracy of the bulk funding tenders, block contracting may thus 
prove to be very cost-efficient. 
Further, like the public defender scheme, there is also the benefit that by specialising 
in a particular field of law, the firm will develop experienced representation for poor 
people. This may also mean that faster assistance is provided which will save money 
in court costs and speed up the justice system. In Australia, where trials have had 
excellent results, these traits have been seen along with great reductions in delays for 
· 142 representation. 
14° Clause 74 Legal Services Bill 2000. 
141 Block Contracting is known in other jurisdictions as 'bulk funding' or the 'contracting out' of legal 
services. 
142 Paterson above n 40, 257. 
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The distribution of bulk-funding agreements will also give the Legal Services 
Agency a measure of control over the legal aid system. By choosing where it will 
offer its tenders for legal aid work, the Agency will be able to place legal services 
where they are needed most. Consequently, by transferring resources around the 
country, the Agency can act as a "vehicle for prioritisation" and thus improve the 
level of access to legal services. 143 
2 Disadvantages of Block Contracting 
However, there are of course certain disadvantages with the bulk-funding scheme. 
Already, select committees on the Bill have heard submissions from lawyers that 
contracting out legal services to willing firms will seriously undermine the quality of 
legal representation to the poor. 144 The reason for this is that like the public defender 
scheme, the lawyers who are likely to accept the government's tenders are likely to 
be the under priced and inexperienced junior lawyers. Senior lawyers who are 
unwilling to accept the government's low rates will thus be persuaded to private 
practice. 
Further, the select committee has also heard concerns regarding the limited budgets 
under block contracting. In England, where 'block contracts' are being trialled under 
the Green Paper 145, the contract determines the price and specific volume of legal 
services that are to be provided in a particular district. Criticism has arisen therefore 
over the uncertainty in situations where the services in one district are used up. What 
happens when there are more clients than what are catered for? It is possible 
government guidelines could be used to decide who gets priority of service yet 
solicitors may be influenced by what case is the most profitable. This may then 
defeat the aim of legal aid to provide for the poor and may "tum legal aid into a 
lottery". 146 
143 Paterson aboven 40, 257. 
144 "Inferior Aid Advice Likely Say Lawyers" The Dominion Wellington, New Zealand, 13 April 
2000. 
145 Lord Chancellor's Department Legal Aid - Targeting Need (HMSO, London, 1995). 
146 Tamara Goriely "The Government's Legal Aid Reforms" in A Zuckerman & R Cranston (eds) 
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In New Zealand, there is the potential for similar problems. If a particular contract is 
to cover all legal services in a particular area, then difficulties will arise when, in a 
time of sudden demand, it is impossible for all legal needs to be met by the 
individual law firm. It is possible that people who miss out on being serviced might 
thus have to travel elsewhere and this could have repercussions for the geographical 
accessibility of legal services. In the Netherlands, this very problem was 
determinative in the Ministry of Justices' overall decision to abandon plans for bulk 
funding .147 Obviously, it is essential that the government's tender offers are 
realistically set or that they allow for accessible back-up services. 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of block contracting has however been the lack of 
'choice' when requiring legal representation. Poor litigants would have no personal 
choice in the selection of their civil representation but would instead be serviced by 
the district ' s legal service provider. The importance of the right to choice of counsel, 
as highlighted by the discussion of public defender systems above, would suggest 
that its absence is a significant deterrent to the wholesale introduction of block 
contracting in New Zealand. Indeed, this was a significant concern in Australia 
where block contracts have already been tried and failed to be widely utilised. 148 
3 Conclusion 
Block contracting obviously nuses many of the concerns seen with the public 
defender scheme. While there is definitely potential to save money, there is also a 
danger that the government tenders will be accepted by low quality law firms or 
individually inexperienced lawyers . Furthermore, there is a clear loss of the right to 
counsel of choice, which is important in enabling the efficiency of counsel and that 
of the adversarial system. Consequently, the current level of access to justice 
provided by the judicare scheme may well be undermined. 
VIII CURRENT GOVERNMENT REVIEWS 
147 Paterson above n 40, 258. 
148 Paterson above n 40, 2598. 
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As part of the government's deterrrunation to keep legal aid's expenses contained, 
the previous Justice Minister, Tony Ryall, stated that particular aspects of the legal 
aid scheme would be under review. Specifically, this review would look at changes 
to the current eligibility criterion for legal aid, increases in the contributions required 
from users of the scheme, and an investigation of the necessity for community law 
centres. In terms of access to justice, it is necessary to examine the desirability of 
such changes. 
A The Eligibility Review 
The eligibility criterion is obviously essential to the objectives of legal aid in New 
Zealand. Purely by reason of its formulaic means test, it is decided who is entitled to 
receive state-assistance for obtaining legal representation, and who must rely on their 
own means in the private market. As discussed earlier, it is thus essential for the 
means-test to be accurately set so that assistance can be supplied to the right people 
and universal access to justice achieved. 
However, over the years, government's inaction with respect to the financial test has 
been its primary means of keeping a lid on the costs of legal aid. Since the $2000 
means test was introduced in 1969, the government has refused to alter it to match 
inflation and thus the same test is used today. 149 Effectively, this has meant that 
eligibility for legal aid has gradually eroded since its introduction and consequently, 
with each passing year, fewer people have been able to claim legal assistance for 
criminal or civil proceedings. There is thus an increasing gap between those who are 
eligible for legal aid and those who can afford private legal services. 
The Law Commission's paper thus highlights some of these gaps which have arisen 
even since the passing of the Legal Services Act 1991. 150 At the time of the Act, all 
people with an annual income a third higher than the base levels of the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit were eligible for legal aid. Since then however, increases in benefit 
levels to match inflation have meant that many beneficiaries are now unable to claim 
149 Some changes were made in 1987 when the government updated the deductible allowances for 
disposable income and capital, yet these changes have not matched the effects of inflation. Morris 
above n 23, 134. 
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legal aid. For example, as at 1 February 1999, the base benefit rate for a sole parent 
with two children was $14 472.25. Under legal aid's current deduction allowances, 
this parent will now have $2400 of disposable income and be thus ineligible for legal 
aid. 
The legal aid eligibility criterion is thus clearly out of step with other forms of state 
assistance. This is also demonstrated by the eligibility for Community Service Cards. 
Since 1995-1996, the qualifying income for these Cards has been raised to keep them 
in line with benefit levels. 151 These levels have consistently been higher than that for 
Legal Aid and this shows that the scheme is clearly out of step with other forms of 
government assistance and thus needs to be upgraded in the near future. 
It is therefore strongly recommended that the financial criteria not be lowered to save 
costs. The current inconsistencies with other state assistance services demonstrates 
that the eligibility criterion for Legal Aid is inadequate in providing people of 
insufficient means with state funded legal representation. Certainly, the 
government's continued unwillingness to update the $2000 financial threshold means 
that there is already a significant and increasing gap between those who can afford 
legal services and those who can obtain government assistance. Further erosion of 
this amount would pose a serious threat to access to justice in our society. 
B Increased Financial Contributions 
Cont1ibution levels are also an essential part of the legal aid scheme. Essentially, 
they ensure that the scheme recovers enough revenue to continue the supply of legal 
services to the poor and thus the fulfilment of its objectives. The amount of 
contributions may however have an undesirable effect. If levels are too high, eligible 
citizens will be deterred by the financial consequences of using the scheme and will 
thus be unwilling, or unable, to achieve their own access to justice in society. It is 
therefore crucial for contribution levels to be set at an appropriate level. 
150 Morris above n 23 , 136. 
151 Morris above n 23 , 136. 
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1 The $50 initial contribution 
Under the current structure of legal aid, applicants are required to make a mandatory 
$50 initial contribution to the Legal Services Board. 152 The rationale for imposing 
this requirement upon applicants seems to be to deter trivial actions and to bring in 
more revenue. 153 However, questions can be asked of the necessity of such a demand 
upon legal aid users. 
For example, the Law Commission reports that the average weekly income of civil 
legal aid recipients in the 1998-1999 year was $258. 154 The $50 contribution thus 
constitutes a significant proportion of the average applicant's weekly income and can 
therefore act as an undesirable deterrent to applications for civil and criminal aid. 
This same deterrent has been noticed in criminal legal aid. The 1997 report In the 
Interests of Justice noted that proportionately fewer applications were made for legal 
aid in areas where the $50 contribution was routinely imposed. 155 Arguably, the 
'hardship' proviso should arguably exclude cases where $50 would have a 
detrimental effect yet the figures show that only 18% of applicants were relieved 
through this mechanism. 156 
Clearly then, the necessity of the $50 contribution must be questioned. The Legal 
Services Board has stated that it is necessary as a deterrent to trivial actions yet 
surely enough checks and balances exist to ensure the scheme is not abused. For 
example, Registrars and sub-committees possess the discretion to refuse applications 
for legal aid on a variety of reasons, which include unreasonable causes of actions. 157 
Furthermore, the relevance of the initial contribution to gathering revenue is doubted 
when the 1997-98 year saw only $1.17m brought in on this account. 158 
If revenue is to be a justification for the $50 initial contribution, then surely there 
must be alternative avenues for raising funds. One option could be to change the 
152 Sections 8 and 37 Legal Services Act 1991. 
153 J Rowan "Legal Aid in New Zealand" [1993] NZLJ 396,401. 
154 Morris above n 23, 134. 
155 Interests of Justice above n 72, 35. 
156 Morris above n 23, 135. 
157 Sections 7 and 28 Legal Services Act 1991. 
158 Morris above n 23, 134. 
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costs rules for crirrunal proceedings. Currently, the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 
provides the general rule that where a defendant in crirrunal cases is successful, that 
defendant is entitled to costs from the Crown. 159 The reason for this is because the 
accused did not choose to be prosecuted, and so it is unfair to require the defendant 
to experience the considerable expense of defending themselves when their liberty, 
reputation and pocket are at stake. 160 
However, where the defendant is legally aided, the courts have held that the 
defendant, and effectively the Legal Services Board, is not able to recoup its costs. 
This is because section 2 of the Act defines 'costs' as "any expenses incurred by a 
party" and thus, since the Board is not a party, it cannot recover costs. 161 In 
Harrington v R the Court of Appeal stated that the Board's wish to have the ability to 
recover costs was understandable given that income it derives from other sources 
goes into its accounts and would be available to maintain or enhance legal aid 
services elsewhere. 162 However, the court saw no real point in allowing this as the 
income it does gain comes from the same public funds that support its statutory 
obligations. The court did finish though by saying that costs awards may be justified 
considering the desirability of the Board's autonomous status and transparency in 
public accounts. However they said that this was not a matter for the courts and made 
their decision on the legislation at hand. 
It is submitted that costs become recoverable. At these times, legal aid is under 
immense pressure to keep a lid on costs and seems to be restrained by the lirruted 
government resources allocated it. As an autonomous entity it should be allowed to 
recover costs awards, thereby allowing it to make more grants where there are 
reasonable chances of a favourable outcome. The small amount of income this 
generates could easily remove the need for the unnecessary $50 initial contribution 
imposed on legally aided applicants. 
2 Further Contributions 
159 Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 
160 Acuthan v Coates (1986) 6 NSWLR 472,480. 
161 Section 2 Costs in Crimjnal Cases Act 1967. 
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Even more criticism has been directed at the further financial contributions imposed 
by Registrars and District Sub-committees. On the face of it, there is not any 
opposition to the idea that where someone has the means to repay the legal services 
which have been rendered, then they should do so. This fits with the aim of social 
policy to shift the time at which people have to pay for services they need from 
pe1iods when they cannot pay, to times when they can. 163 
However, discomfort has arisen with the Board's ability to ensure its repayment by 
placing a charge over property "preserved or recovered" in the course of 
proceedings. 164 The Board maintains that this charging arrangement is only used in 
8% of cases, yet this belies the significant part that it plays as a deterrent to obtaining 
justice. 165 For example, women are the majority users of civil legal aid and most of 
these cases involve matrimonial property disputes where the family assets are split -
the woman often retaining the home and control of the children. Yet the woman is 
typically left on a low income and thus the possibility of a charge on the only real 
asset, the matrimonial home, can serve as a significant deterrent to bringing a civil 
action. 
In some ways the Legal Services Act has addressed the undesirability of financial 
contributions in several cases. For example, protection orders under the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995 are exempt from contribution requirements. 166 The rationale is 
clearly that an action for the prevention and protection from violence needs an 
uninhibited path to the courtroom. Yet in the interests of justice, it could be argued 
that there are many proceedings which are necessary to prevent violence, for 
example, the custody of children and division of matrimonial property. If it is 
recognised that financial contributions are unnecessary in certain situations, why is it 
only domestic violence cases? As the Law Commission says, the Act's reaction to a 
social problem covers only "the narrowest range of meritorious situations". 167 
162 Harrington v R [1994] 3 NZLR 272 (CA). 
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C Funding for Community Law Centres 
As stated earlier, legal information and advice is essential for enabling the client to 
identify and choose a legal solution before they actually pursue it. In many respects 
legal advice is thus a prerequisite to access to justice through legal representation. 
However, in contrast to England' s system of legal aid, New Zealand makes no 
allowance for the provision of information and advice to the poor. Through its 
neglect, the New Zealand government has thus effectively stated that the 
responsibility for legal information and education is upon the community. 
The Ministry of Justice reinforced this in its submission to the Law Commission, 
highlighting the need for community initiatives and responsibility concerning the 
provision of legal inf01mation. 168 Further, Becraft states that "community law centres 
are operated for a community, by a community, to bring about change in or benefit to 
a community .. . Ideally the establishment of community legal services arises from the 
initiative of the community itself and on-going community control is paramount." 169 
Undoubtedly, there are thus grounds for saying that the responsibility for legal advice 
and information is clearly the community' s. This emphasises the importance of 
community law centres in society. Since their introduction in the early 1980s, 24 
centres around the country have emerged to address the public's need for legal 
information and advice.170 However, the growth of these centres raises questions of 
funding. 
Currently, the Law Society's Special Fund is used to fund these centres yet this is 
thought to soon become inadequate because of fluctuating interest rates on the trust 
accounts, and a greater demand for funding. 171 Pressure has also come from the Law 
Society who submit that the interest on trust accounts to meet social objectives "is an 
168 Ministry of Justice Briefi11g Paper (October, 1996) in Morris above n 23 , 110. 
169 Becraft "Community Law Centres Here to Stay" (1992) 22 Northern Law News 4. 
170 "Lawyer ' s Levy Saves Law Centres" Th e Evening Post Wellington, New Zealand, 19 November 
1999. 
171 Evening Post above n 170. Already, because interest rates have fallen , there has been a shortfall in 
funding for Wellington's three community law centres. Wellington lawyers have met this by paying 
$40 each to meet the $70 OOO shortfall. 
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exprop1iation for which there is no justification". 172 The Law Society contends that 
the money should instead be used for the legal profession's fidelity fund. The 
funding for community Jaw centres is therefore on shaky ground and it is unlikely 
that funds will come from the legal aid budget. It may thus be necessary to call for 
more government funding or a greater input from the legal profession. 
This however raises the question again of the commitment that the legal profession 
should be expected to make to the access to justice debate. It is possible that more 
can be expected. Lawyers have in fact accepted responsibility for legal information. 
It is a function of district law societies, for example, to publish legal information 
pamphlets for the benefit of public, and to operate community Jaw centres.
173 Indeed, 
the Auckland District Law Society currently levies each of its members $50 to 
support law centres around the country, while in Wellington, lawyers have 
contributed $40 each to meet a $70,000 shortfall in funding for its three law 
centres. 174 Perhaps more commitment from the government is however needed to 
meet its own responsibilities for filling gaps in the access to justice debate. 
IX CONCLUSION 
At the present time, the funding of the legal aid scheme is a serious concern for 
politicians and the public in New Zealand. While adequate access to justice was once 
the primary objective, there now seems to be an overriding determination to stem the 
flow from the taxpayer purse and rein in the costs of the legal aid scheme. 
Unfortunately, while such intentions are entirely reasonable in today's decline from 
the welfare state, the fundamental need for equal access to justice in society cannot 
become a secondary consideration. 
This essay has shown that the government's current measures for reducing the costs 
of legal aid may have undesirable side effects for access to justice. Cuts to lawyers' 
remuneration rates threaten to undermine the quality of legal services for the poor 
while public defenders and block contracting also endanger the quality of legal 
172 New Zealand Law Society submission in Morris above n 23, 109. 
173 Sections 5 and 6 Law Practitioners Act 1982. 
174 'Lawyer 's Levy"above n 170. 
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counsel and remove a litigant's right to choice of counsel. The current reviews of 
eligibility and contribution levels are also troublesome. Evidence suggests eligibility 
crite1ia and contribution levels should not be utilised to save costs as they already act 
to exclude many needy citizens from the scheme's coverage. Lastly, in order to 
ensure appropriate levels of access to justice in New Zealand, it will be necessary to 
ensure the further funding of community law centres, and thus the provision of legal 
advice. 
While the government's present measures thus appear undesirable, other alternatives 
need to be considered. Contingency fees and legal expenses insurance are ideas 
currently being considered by the Law Society and wider business world. These 
options may assist in providing free services for poor litigants at no cost to the 
current legal aid scheme. Similarly, others are considering changes to the nature of 
court proceedings, so that justice might be delivered in a quick and cheaper way. 
Whatever the case, constant attention to the level of access to justice in society can 
only be healthy for the community. Answers must be found to rein in the current 
costs of the scheme without disturbing access to justice. As the President of the Legal 
Services Board has recently noted: "Certainly the costs of legal aid must be 
contained. But any changes eventually put in place should not hobble legal aid's 
benefits. They are too valuable to lose."
175 
175 Ian Haynes in Zindel above n 2, 2 . 
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